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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCISCO ROSA CAMACHO, \ 
Plaintiff, I 
— vs. — 1 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION V 
OF UTAH, and / 
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7518 
KENNECOTT COPPER COMPANY, 
(Utah Copper Division) 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action is an original proceeding in this court. The 
plaintiff asks the court to review the decision of the In-
dustrial Commission of the State of Utah and to find that 
the decision and findings of fact are not supported by any 
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substantial evidence and are contrary to the evidence pre-
sented to the Commission, and are contrary to law* 
Camacho was employed by the Kennecott Copper 
Company, Utah Copper Division, as a trackman on Sep-
tember 15, 1946 (record P. 104)- Prior to that time he 
had worked as an agricultural employee on a farm in Glass-
boro, New Jersey, (R. 104) for two months and prior to 
coming to New Jersey as a waiter and soda fountain worker 
in Puerto Rico for seventeen years and ten months (R. 
104). The plaintiff is a Puerto Rican and speaks Spanish. 
He does not speak English, and it was necessary to obtain 
his testimony at the hearing through the use of an inter-
preter. On the day he was employed by Kennecott, Cama-
cho was examined by a company doctor at Bingham for 
the express purpose of determining his physical fitness 
for employment (R. pp. 95 and 102). The examining phy-
sician reported as a result of this examination: "Appear-
ance: okay . . . hands and arms: okay . . . spine and joints: 
okay . . . chest, abdomen and groin: okay . . . " (R. 102). 
The examining physician made no remarks under the 
heading "defects that disqualify" or "defects that do not 
disqualify" or "kind of work not allowed." He stated in-
stead "I certify that I have carefully examined the appli-
cant named herein, and that the foregoing is a correct 
description of his physical condition. As a result of my 
examination, I find that he does possess all of the re-
quirements of health in body, mind and special senses nec-
essary for the position of " R. 103) 
Between the time of his employment in September 
and the date of the injury, October 30, 1946, plaintiff 
worked as a trackman. Part of his duties consisted of work 
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with a pick and shovel. A share of his time was spent 
stacking railroad ties. These ties weigh approximately 150 
pounds and they are piled in stacks of one hundred each. 
By the time the top of the stack is reached workers must 
lift the ties in a position over their heads. The plaintiff and 
two fellow workers testified that plaintiff was able to and 
did in fact lift ties of this kind over his head regularly 
during the first six weeks of this employment (R. 46-47, 
49-50,52). 
On October 30th, 1946, plaintiff was unloading ties 
from a box car at Bingham. A pick which he was using 
as a lever forcing a tie out of a pile inside a boxcar slipped 
and the plaintiff lost his balance and fell backwards strik-
ing his back and left shoulder on a pile of ties (R. 50-53). 
He was lowered from the boxcar and taken to the emer-
gency hospital and from there to St. Mark's Hospital in 
Salt Lake City. 
Upon arrival at the hospital he was examined by an 
intern and then by Doctor W. M. Pugh, Medical Adviser 
for the Kennecott Company. Dr. Pugh testified - "He could 
not talk too well, but he indicated the site of his pain as 
the lower right side and back of his scapular area and the 
shoulder area on the left side." (R. 70). There were two 
sets of X-ray pictures taken at the hospital, the second set 
being taken after the first showed there was something 
wrong with the left shoulder joint (R. 70-71). Particularly 
the second set of X-rays taken showed that there was a 
pre-existing disease of the left shoulder joint (R. 81). On 
October 31, 1946, Dr. A. J. Wilson, the X-ray specialist 
at St. Mark's Hospital, reported to Dr. Pugh, as a result 
of the second X-rays, that there was a fracture of the left 
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second rib (R. 105), The X-rays show the place of the 
fracture to be approximately two inches from the joint 
itself (R. 91)- The Commission did not include any of 
the X-rays with the record certified to this Court. 
Camacho was treated at the hospital for about ten 
days and then after a short rest returned to work at Bing-
ham at the suggestion of Dr. Pugh and the Company doc-
tors (R. 85). Upon his return to the track gang he could 
not do the heavy work lifting ties, but asked for and was 
given lighter tasks. He was able to perform light work, 
but he had a persistent pain in his left shoulder. The pain 
continued from the time of the injury until the examina-
tion, and Camacho testified that he has had gradually less 
motion in his joint (R. 54)- Since returning to work, Ca-
macho has never had full use of his shoulder. At first he 
worked with a pick and shovel, but more recently he has 
been a waterboy (R. 54-56). Neither the pick and shovel 
work nor the waterboy job involved the use of the shoulder 
joint (R. 57-58). 
Applicant's theory was that, when he went to work 
for Kennecott, there was a quiescent diseased condition of 
the left shoulder, but it caused no pain, and there was full 
use of the shoulder. The accident of October 30, 1946, ac-
celerated and lighted up the condition, and over a period 
of several months resulted in almost complete atrophy and 
loss of function of the joint. The Court's attention is in-
vited to the applicant's medical testimony (R. 23-44, 57-
58), the medical theories of which the Commission says it 
does not question (R. 17). 
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The Commission correctly states the issues to be: 
L Did applicant sustain an injury to his left shoulder? 
2. If so, did that injury aggravate the pre-existing 
shoulder disease and cause the pre-existing muscle atrophy 
in whole or in part? (See decision R. 17) The positions 
taken by the Company doctors at the hearing were that the 
same condition existed as to limitation of motion and func-
tion of the shoulder prior to the injury as exists at the pres-
ent time, and that there was no injury to the shoulder what-
ever at the time of the accident. 
Because plaintiff and applicant takes the position that 
the findings of the Commission in conformity with these 
two positions by the Company are unsupported by any 
substantial evidence, the testimony of the doctors is not 
recited more completely in the statement of facts. It is the 
position of Camacho, that the Company's own evidence 
does not support and is contrary to these theories, and that 
the Commission bases part of its primary findings upon 
pure and simple hearsay evidence; that other findings are 
based upon testimony completely impeached and self-con-
tradicted, and that findings based upon this kind of evi-
dence are improper as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. The Commission is not authorized to make 
findings based solely on hearsay evidence and any such 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence as a 
matter of law. 
POINT II. The testimony of Dr. Pugh upon which 
the Decision of the Commission was based was self-con-
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tradicted and impeached upon cross examination; it was 
therefore not substantial evidence, and findings of fact 
based upon such evidence are contrary to law. 
POINT III. The findings of the Commission that 
there was no injury to the shoulder and that the present 
condition pre-existed the accident are not supported by any 
substantial evidence and are contrary to the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COMMISSION IS NOT AU-
THORIZED TO MAKE FINDINGS BASED SOLELY 
ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND ANY SUCH FIND-
INGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
It is recognized, of course, that under the modern 
theory of the nature of the quasi-judicial agencies and their 
function in determination of various kinds of problems 
in connection generally with administrative law, the classic 
hearsay rule has lost a great deal of its former effect and 
significance. Hearsay is almost uniformly held to be admis-
sible in hearings before Commissions such as the Indus-
trial Commission of this state. Plaintiff concedes for the 
purpose of argument in this case that hearsay testimony is 
admissible. However, it is a very different thing to say that 
it is admissible and to contend that findings based upon 
hearsay are based upon substantial evidence. 
The question of the admissibility of evidence is cer-
tainly a different question from the determination of the 
weight of the evidence one admitted. Probably no lawyer 
would contend that such a statement as "J°lin told Mary 
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that Dick told her that he (Dick) saw a flying saucer" 
produced out of the mouth of John would be substantial 
evidence. Yet, it is not certain that such a statement would 
be inadmissible in a hearing before the Industrial Com-
mission. The distinction was recently pointed out by a 
Federal Court: 
"The statute says that the findings shall be 
conclusive if supported by evidence, but this is in 
paragraph (e), section 10, 29 U. S. C. A. 160 (e), 
which is dealing with the controversy after it has 
reached the judicial state. The word "evidence" in 
this connection refers to the means by which any al-
leged matter of fact is established or disproved in a 
court of justice. That the evidence must be material 
is indicated in the very next sentence; that it must 
also be competent and relevant is the general rule 
which remains in effect in the absence of a legis-
lative intent to the contrary. There is nothing in the 
act to indicate that the conclusion of the Board as 
to the fit and appropriate proof in the particular 
case should be conclusive. 
"It is elementary that questions respecting the 
competency and admissibility of evidence are en-
tirely distinct from those which relate to its tSect 
or sufficiency; the former being exclusively for the 
court, the latter exclusively for the jury. If the Board 
should base its findings solely upon evidence ob-
tained by an unconstitutional search, the order rest-
ing thereon would be invalid, because such evidence 
is incompetent. Other illustrations might be given, 
but it is unnecessary to belabor the point. 
"The provision in paragraph (b), section 10, 
29 U. S. C. A. 160 (b) with reference to the rules 
of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity 
not being controlling, means that it is not error for 
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the Board to hear incompetent evidence. It does not 
mean that a finding of fact may rest solely upon 
such evidence. Whether there be any competent evi-
dence to support the findings of the Board is a ques-
tion of law; whether it is sufficient is a question of 
fact. The decision of the Board upon a question of 
law is not conclusive in this court. (National Labor 
Relations Board v. Bell Oil and Gas Co., 98 F. (2d) 
870,871.) 
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated 
that, as a matter of law, findings of an administrative tri-
bunal based solely on hearsay are not based upon substan-
tial evidence: 
"The companies urge that the Board received 're-
mote hearsay1 and 'mere rumor/ The statute pro-
vides that 'rules of evidence prevailing in courts of 
law or equity shall not be controlling/ The obvious 
purpose of this and similar provisions is to free ad-
ministrative boards from the compulsion of tech-
nical rules so that the mere admission of matter 
which would be deemed incompetent in judicial pro-
ceedings would not invalidate the administrative 
order. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 
194 U. S. 25, 44, 48 L. ed. 860, 869, 24 S. Ct. 563; 
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. 
R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 57 L. ed. 431, 434, 33 S. 
Ct. 185; United States v. Abilene & S. R. Co., 265 
U. S. 274, 288, 68 L. ed. 1016, 1022, 44 S. Ct. 565; 
Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 
420, 442, 74 L. ed. 524, 535, 50 S. Ct. 220. But 
this assurance of a desirable flexibility in adminis-
trative procedure does not go so far as to justify 
orders without a basis in evidence having rational 
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or ru-
mor does not constitute substantial evidence.'' 
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(Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National 
Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197, 83 L. Ed, 
126,59 Sup. Ct. 206.) 
In the case at bar, the Commission puts great em-
phasis upon and bases part of its findings upon a surgical 
report of Dr. Pugh, dated October 30, 1946, and filed 
with the Commission November 13, 1946, in which Dr. 
Pugh stated: 
"Fell on back while at work. X-rays show old de-
forming disease of left shoulder with restriction 
of motion. Fracture left rib, also evidence of for-
eign substance pre-existing in right hip area. Frac-
ture right transverse process third lumbar verte-
brae." 
The Commission states: "We have no reason to disbe-
lieve that report. We are compelled to find that 'deform-
ing disease with restriction of motion' was present on the 
day of the injury, October 30th, 1946." The Commission 
refers to Dr. Pugh's report several times in its decision 
stating in one place "at that time no one contemplated that 
a dispute would arise and, therefore, we find no basis for 
rejecting the report of Dr. Pugh." It is apparent that a 
great deal of weight was given to it. 
This report of Dr. Pugh is pure and simple and patent 
self-serving hearsay and while it may be admissible, it is 
absolutely fallacious for the Commission to base its de-
cision upon it. What Dr. Pugh says to the Commission in 
1946 is as much hearsay as what Dr. Pugh would say to 
John Doe concerning the accident. With due respect to Dr. 
Pugh's medical ability, it is a well-known fact that he has 
been employed by Kennecott Copper Company for years, 
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both as a physician and surgeon and as a witness before 
the Industrial Commission. For the Commission to ex-
press its opinion that a statement by him to the Commis-
sion itself six weeks after an industrial accident, is made 
"at a time no one contemplated that a dispute would arise'' 
is absolutely absurd. Dr. Pugh's business is to foresee the 
possibility of disputes, and to protect the Company against 
their consequences. Self-made evidence should be viewed 
with caution by the Commission instead of being made the 
basis of findings. The rule applied in this case would give 
every insurer under the Act an unmistakable advantage 
over injured employees simply by filing favorable reports 
before a claim for compensation is made. At the hearing 
Commissioner Weiseley took pains to point out that the 
opinion of the medical advisory board was not evidence 
and not to be considered as evidence by the Commission 
(R. 25). Yet the Commission bases its decision upon the 
self-serving report to it of a doctor paid by Kennecott Cop-
per Company. Applicant will point in the brief the num-
ber of times that the self-made evidence of Dr. Pugh was 
completely impeached during the course of the hearing. 
The point we wish to make to the court at this time, 
however, is that insofar as the decision of the Commis-
sion is based upon this hearsay report, whether or not such 
evidence was impeached is not based on substantial evi-
dence and is contrary to law. 
POINT II. THE TESTIMONY OF DR. PUGH 
UPON WHICH THE DECISION OF THE COMMIS-
SION WAS BASED, WAS SELF-CONTRADICTED 
AND IMPEACHED UPON CROSS EXAMINATION; 
IT WAS THEREFORE NOT SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
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DENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT BASED UPON 
SUCH EVIDENCE ARE CONTRARY TO LAW. 
Outside of the first surgical report filed with the Com-
mission on November 13, 1946, the bulk of the findings of 
fact are based upon the testimony of Dr. Pugh to the effect 
that the present disability existed at the time of the injury 
on October 30, 1946, and that there was no injury to the 
shoulder at the time of the accident. The position of the 
employer and of Dr. Pugh was stated by the doctor in nar-
rative from beginning at Page 75 of the record. He first 
makes the statement "nowhere, at the hospital or from my 
personal observation, or anyone in our organization, was 
there any evidence of a blow or an injury to the left shoul-
der." (R. 75). The following statements were made, how-
ever, by Dr. Pugh indicating that Camacho did display 
pain of the left shoulder at the time he was examined in 
the hospital. Dr. Pugh stated that the first thing he did, 
when Camacho arrived at the hospital, was to examine him 
physically to ascertain how he was injured and "whether 
an X-ray over the area might indicate anything." In res-
ponse to a question as to whether Camacho told him what 
had happened, Dr. Pugh stated, "He could not talk too well, 
but he indicated the site of his pain as the lower right 
side and back of his scapular area and the shoulder area 
on the left side." 
X-rays were taken at the time of this examination. The 
first X-rays were of Camacho's chest and spine and when 
these X-rays indicated that something was wrong with the 
left shoulder joint, further X-rays were requested. The con-
dition of the bone and joints was not sufficiently indicated 
by the examination to suspect that there was anything 
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wrong with the shoulder. The fact is perfectly clear from 
the most cursory look at Camacho at the present time, 
without his shirt, that there is something wrong with his 
left shoulder. His entire left shoulder and arm down to 
the elbow are nothing but skin and bones. If the present 
condition had existed at the time of this examination, cer-
tainly X-ray would not be required before the condition 
was suspected. 
Dr. Pugh states in his explanation that the condi-
tion at the present time is the same as it was at the time 
of his examination in 1946 (R. 78). He read into the rec-
ord the report of the intern at the hospital. The intern's 
notations admittedly do not indicate anything abnormal 
in the appearance of the shoulder joint. On cross examin-
ation this series of questions and answers occurred: (R. 78) 
Q May I see that hospital report? Doctor, are you 
head of the Medical Staff of the Kennecott Cop-
per Company? 
A I am associated with it. 
Q You are acquainted with the kind of physical 
examination that men receive when they go to 
work? 
A Yes. 
Q So far as that examination goes, you usually 
have them bend down and touch their toes, 
don't you? 
A That may or may not be required or asked for. 
Q They are generally required to raise their hands 
above their heads? 
A I would not say that. 
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Q At any rate they are given a very thorough phy** 
sical examination, aren't they? 
A Yes, but a man with a shoulder like that, he can 
bring his arm up to forty-five degrees and use 
his forearm and elbow and all that. He could 
mask a thing of that kind. 
Q Do you usually pass a man with muscular 
atrophy? 
A Ordinarily not. 
Q When a man comes to the hospital, if it is 
muscular atrophy, would that be unusual for 
the intern not to make a notation of it on his 
physical examination? 
A Not necessarily. 
Q You think it is a normal thing? 
A Oh, this man was looking for an injury. 
Q If a man comes in and was complaining of pain 
in the upper part of his back and chest, and he 
had very marked atrophy of the shoulder mus-
cles, would it be unusual for him not to make 
a notation? 
A Yes. But on the other hand he did order X-ray 
pictures of his chest. 
Q He made no notation of anything unusual 
about the left shoulder? 
A No, I don't see any. 
Q But he did say severe tenderness over the ribs 
and in the left scapula? 
A Yes. 
Dr. Pugh states that Camacho never complained to 
any hospital personnel about pain in his shoulder, and yet 
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he admits that Camacho spoke Spanish and little, if any, 
English. He does not know whether the hospital nurses and 
interns speak Spanish. (R. 81) Dr. Pugh's testimony and 
the report of the intern affirmatively state that the left 
shoulder area was indicated by Camacho as being painful. 
No mention, perhaps, need be made of the obvious fact 
that Dr. Pugh doesn't know what Camacho said during 
the hours that the Doctor wasn't there. In fairness, and as 
a matter of law, how can the Commission give any pro-
bative force to such testimony? 
It is pointed out in this connection that on the day 
the second X-rays were taken of Camacho's shoulder, the 
roentgenologist reported to Dr. Pugh " additional study of 
the dorsal spine, thorax, and left shoulder confirms the 
presence of the left second rib fracture." The common ex-
perience of men is that a blow sufficient to fracture a rib 
two inches from a joint would produce pain in the area 
of the joint. Can a finding to the contrary be said to be 
based on substantial evidence? 
In the fact of these statements by Dr. Pugh on direct 
and cross examination, the Commission found that Ca-
macho did not complain of any pain in his left shoulder at 
the time he went to the hospital and that there was no 
injury of the left shoulder. It is admitted that no bruises or 
abrasions were discovered in this area on examination, but 
this Court can take cognizance of a matter of such com-
mon knowledge that injuries and blows, and even frac-
tures, most often do not produce bruises or abrasions. The 
Court certainly must conclude that there is no substantial 
evidence to support the Commission's finding that there 
was no injury to the shoulder. All of the evidence, includ-
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ing the Company's own records, and the hospital records, 
shows that the shoulder was injured and that Camacho 
complained of the injured shoulder. 
The second major finding of the Commission was that 
the condition of the left shoulder joint pre-existed the in-
jury and that the injury did not aggravate the condition, 
and that the entire disability pre-existed before the injury. 
Here, again, the testimony of Dr. Pugh is relied upon. Ad-
mittedly Dr. Pugh testified, on direct examination and in 
his narrative statement, that the same condition exists in 
the shoulder now as existed at the time of his examination 
on October 30, 1946. The Court's attention is invited to 
the contradictory and impeaching statements made by Dr. 
Pugh on cross examination. He stated that Camacho was 
examined by a Company doctor six weeks before the time 
of the injury and that no indication was made in the phy-
sician's report of any unusual appearance of the left shoul-
der or any disability. He does not deny that it is customary 
for a man being examined to be required to place his hands 
over hi s head and to touch his feet with his hands. He ad-
mits that it would be very unusual for a man in Cama-
cho's i resent condition to be passed by a medical examiner. 
He ad nits that a man with muscular atrophy would or-
dinari. y not be passed. He admits that it would be unusual 
for ar intern not to make a notation of muscular atrophy 
as skwn by the present examination and that the intern 
did nv t make such a notation at the time of his examination. 
He a.lmits that the man has at least 75% permanent dis-
ability of the left arm at the present time, and that only six 
weeks before injury he was certified by Company doctors 
as being physically qualified for the job. 
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The second X-rays showing the condition of the left 
shoulder joint were not taken until after the first X-rays 
indicated there was something wrong with the joint. Cer-
tainly the marked atrophy at the present time was not exist-
ing at the time he entered the hospital As heretofore stated, 
the man's left shoulder and arm was nothing but skin and 
bones. It would be the first thing any doctor would see 
upon examination. The man cannot lift his arm except that 
he has enough motion to put his left hand to his mouth, 
Dr, Pugh admits that in the disease of the type here com-
plained of it is not unusual for the condition to exist for 
a number of years in a quiescent state (R, 82) and that a 
blow to the shoulder area would light up or accelerate 
the condition, (R. 87) Dr, Pugh, himself, seems to place 
some importance on the fact that there is no change in the 
condition of the bones as shown by the X-rays between Oc-
tober, 1946, and the time of the evidence before the Com-
mission, However, he admits that the bone condition is all 
that the X-rays show and that the X-rays do not determine 
disability. He hedges about a blow accelerating the condi-
tion shown by the 1946 X-rays, but he could hardly deny 
anything so perfectly obvious even to the unexpert ob-
server, (R, 87-89) 
Dr, Q, B. Coray, who was produced as the X-ray ex-
pert for the Kennecott Company, also stated on cross ex-
amination that the X-rays do not show anything about the 
soft tissues, (R, 64) He admitted that the disease of tuber-
culosis in the joint or tubercular arthritis can exist for a 
long period of time without any discomfort to the patient, 
(R, 65) He admits that the X-rays taken October, 1946, do 
not prove anything about the amount of use that Camacho 
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had of his shoulder. (R. 65) He states that it is not pos-
sible to make a diagnosis of the degree of disability from 
the X-ray. (R. 66) The following question and answer is 
of particular interest: (R. 68) 
Q Dr. Coray, it is perfectly possible, is it not, to 
have an increase in the disability, if any dis-
ability existed in 1946 at the time that first 
film shows, which would not show in the sec-
ond X-rays? 
A Yes, that is medically so, and very logical. 
It is submitted that these statements of Dr. Pugh and 
Dr. Coray, both of defendant's witnesses, entirely refute 
the finding of the Commission to the effect that the dis-
ability now claimed pre-existed the injury. Both doctors 
for defendant testified, in substance, and effect, that a man 
could have the condition shown by the X-rays of October, 
1946, and still have no disability. Camacho and two dis-
interested witnesses produced by Camacho testified that in 
fact Camacho did have full use of his shoulder. We admit 
that the X-rays of 1946 show a pre-existing disease. The 
fact that the disease is there does not show that there was 
a disability. All of the medical experts in the case agree that 
a blow to the shoulder, diseased as Camacho's shoulder was 
in October, 1946, would tend to result in muscular atrophy 
and loss of function. That is precisely the position that 
plaintiff takes with reference to the evidence. Dr. Ershler 
stated that in his opinion and as a result of his consulta-
tion that was what happened. 
It is submitted that there is no medical opinion in the 
record which denies that the plaintiff's theory is sound, as-
suming the fact to be that the plaintiff had the use of his 
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left arm at the time he entered the employment of the de-
fendant and between then and the time of the injury. The 
question of fact to be decided, therefore, is whether plain-
tiff was able to use his arm. Plaintiff established the physical 
fact that he had the use of the arm prior to the injury by 
three witnesses, including himself, and it is corroborated 
by the records of Kennecott itself. Opinion evidence, con-
trary to established physical facts, is not substantial evi-
dence. The Utah case in point is: Haarstick v. Oregon 
Short Line Railroad Co., (1927) 70 Ut. 552, 262 Pac. 100; 
and see Owen v. Appalachian Power Co., (1915) 78 W. 
Va. 596, 89 S. E. 262. The cases holding evidence of phy-
sical facts and capability to be superior to opinion evi-
dence are numerous. Even, therefore, if there was opinion 
evidence contrary to the proof of plaintiff that he was able 
to put his hands above his head, it could not justify the re-
jection of the evidence of physical facts. 
It is to be noted that even if it was a fact that there 
was restriction of motion at the time of Dr. Pugh's first 
medical report, as is contended in the hearsay evidence re-
ferred to under Point I of this brief, that report was issued 
after the accident. It does not tend to show that there ivas 
any limitation of motion before the accident. It is perfectly 
logical to infer that if a man with a diseased shoulder joint 
of the kind Camacho had in 1946 received a blow to the 
shoulder, he would have difficulty in moving it that he did 
not have before the blow. Dr. Pugh's report, therefore, 
has little, if any, probative weight for this reason, as well as 
for the reason that it is hearsay. It is to be noted that while 
Dr. Pugh testified at the hearing that he had the same 
amount of atrophy now as he had on October 30, 1946, 
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he did not even mention atrophy in his report, nor did the 
intern in his report. Moreover, he sent the man back to 
work and admits that a man in Camacho's present con-
dition should not be hired or working* 
It is submitted to the court that, in view of these ad-
missions on cross examination of Dr. Pugh and Dr. Winter, 
it cahnot be said that Dr. Pugh's statements to the contrary 
on direct examination are substantial evidence to sustain 
the Commission's finding. 
POINT III. THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMIS-
SION THAT THERE WAS NO INJURY TO THE 
SHOULDER AND THAT THE PRESENT CONDI-
TION PRE-EXISTED THE ACCIDENT ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
AND ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
We have discussed in some detail the testimony of Dr. 
Pugh and although it is, of course, pertinent here we shall 
not repeat what we have previously referred to concerning 
the inconsistencies of his statements. Plaintiff's position is 
that if a witness says on direct examination, "I saw con-
ditions A, B and C," and on cross examination admits 
that he did not see conditions A, B and C, and that he was 
in no position to see them, as a matter of law, a finding to 
the effect that the witness saw conditions A, B and C is 
not supported by any substantial evidence. This principle 
of law is perfectly obvious in application to the facts in the 
present case. The Commission has seized upon the most 
favorable statements made by Dr. Pugh and Dr. Coray on 
their direct examination, and the most favorable implica-
tions that could be drawn from these statements, despite 
the fact that they were substantially contradicted in their 
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cross examination. It seems clear in principle that the very 
purpose of cross examination is to see whether a witness's 
testimony will withstand the test of scrutiny and inquiry. 
Unless a party is bound by statements of his witnesses on 
cross examination, the entire purpose and meaning of cross 
examination is lost. It would be a different situation if 
there was any other evidence to support the propositions 
found by the Commission, but it cannot be contended in 
the present case that there is any evidence other than the 
statements of Dr. Pugh to substantiate the findings of the 
Commission. No other evidence was produced. The Com-
pany did not even attempt to prove that Camacho was 
unable to lift ties over his head when he went to work. Cer-
tainly it was within their power to produce such evidence, 
if it existed. The Company certainly cannot deny that 
Camacho received an injury on October 30, 1946. The 
Company's own records and the hospital records indicate 
-that the shoulder was the site of the injury. Of course, thef 
X-rays shown at the hospital establish a pre-existing di-
sease. It is probable that even Camacho did not know of 
the diseased condition of his joint. It is not for either the 
Commission or the Court to speculate whether the disease 
would have produced disability, if there had been no blow 
on the shoulder. This Court has repeatedly held that an 
employer takes an employee as he is with all of his phy-
sical weaknesses, and if it happens that by reason of some 
condition he is more susceptible to injury than a perfect 
physical specimen that is the risk taken by the employer 
under the theory of workman's compensation legislation. 
In Utah-Idaho Central Railroad Co. of Utah et al v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, (1928) 71 Utah 490, 267 
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Pac. 785, the Court said: 
"It thus appears that from whatever angle we view 
the testimony whether the condition of permanent 
partial disability resulted from the accident or re-
sulted from a pre-existing condition the applicant is 
entitled to compensation. A latent disease or trou-
ble, if accelerated or lighted up by an industrial ac-
cident and a more serious injury results by reason 
of the fact of the existence of such latent ailment 
than otherwise would in a normal recovery from in-
juries received from or in an accident, in such case 
the injured employee is entitled to additional com-
pensation.' ' Pinyon Queen Min. Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 59 Utah 402, 204 P. 323; Tintic Mill-
ing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 14, 206 
P. 278; Milford Copper Co. of Utah v. Industrial 
Commission, 61 Utah 37, 210 P. 993; McEwan v. 
Industrial Commission, 61 Utah 585, 217 P. 690; 
Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
63 Utah 59, 221 P. 852. 
And in Pinyon Queen Mining Co. et at v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah (1922) 59 Utah 402, 204 Pac. 323, 
the Court holds squarely that aggravation of a pre-existing 
condition is compensable. The Commission in that case had 
concluded: that the employer takes a man as he is, and 
therefore should pay compensation for the full period of 
disability . . . " even though without the pre-existing syphi-
letic condition there would have been no dire consequences 
of the accident. Numerous Utah cases are to the same 
effect. 
All of the facts in this case, including the testimony 
on cross examination of the defendant's own witnesses, 
shows that the injury of October 30, 1946, lighted up and 
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accelerated and contributed to the present disability of Ca-
macho. All of the evi3ence shows that Camacho had had 
the use of his shoulder in October of 1946. All of the evi-
dence shows that he received a blow to his shoulder in Oc-
tober, 1946. The intent, purpose and effect of such delega-
tion of authority as is found in the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act of this State, is to vest in the Industrial Com-
mission wide discretion in dealing with such matters of 
weighing of testimony and attributing casual connections 
from events to conditions. With the theory of such legis-
lation there can be no quarrel, but when, as in this case, 
the Commission disregards elementary legal principles, and 
bases its decision upon a combination of hearsay and im-
peached testimony, the Court should not hesitate to hold 
that the Commission has exceeded its authority. A litigant 
in the Commission should have no less a right to be put out 
of court, if he is to be out, by evidence of real, probative, 
and rational force, than in any other judicial proceeding. 
It is submitted that this Court should enter an order 
vacating and setting aside the decision of the Commission 
and that the Commission should be instructed to determine 
the amount of disability of the plaintiff as between 75% 
and 90%, and that the Court should determine, as a matter 
of law, that the Commission's decision and the findings 
of fact therein contained are not supported by any substan-
tial evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE M. McMILLAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
